INTRODUCTION
Blasphemy, religious defamation and hate speech are subjects which have been on the agenda on a global as well as a regional level quite frequently in recent last years. From the infamous Danish "cartoons crisis", up to the tragic events concerning Charlie Hebdo in Paris, many examples prove the devastating effects that such behaviour can elicit and the urgent necessity to deal with it in legal systems. However, such legal measures must be implemented with the utmost consideration for the fundamental human right to freedom of speech, and any possibility to abuse these measures for political reasons or even persecution of minorities needs to be eliminated as far as possible.
AIMS AND METHOD OF THIS CHAPTER
At the UN level, an important step towards implementing legal measures against hate speech in a sufficiently cautious manner was the adoption of the Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or Religious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence.
2 It covers advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. An expert group adopted this document on 5 October 2012 in the capital of Morocco, Rabat. Its preparation was accomplished in 2011 at four regional meetings for Europe, Africa, Asia and Pacific as well as the Americas. This regional entrenchment suggests the need for an analysis of how the Rabat Plan's subject matters are treated on the individual continents. 1 The author holds the chair for Canon Law, especially Theological Principles of Canon Law, General Norms, Constitutional Law and Eastern Canon Law, at LudwigMaximilians-Universität Munich (Klaus Mörsdorf Institute of Canon Law). He further holds academic degrees in secular law, philosophy and Catholic theology. Translation by Fr. Augustinus Fries.
• Blasphemy covers "remarks or actions considered to be contemptuous of God". 5 It is explicitly directed against God and based on the presumption that God needs to be protected from derogatory remarks.
• Defamation of religions consists in a "disparagement or vilification of particular religions or religion in general". 6 It is directed against religions as abstract systems of teachings and practices. When a modern state penalises such defamation, it does not aim to protect God, but the religious feelings of the faithful or religious peace.
• Incitement to religious hatred is directed against individuals who are members of a certain religion, and it consists in a call for hatred, violence or discrimination of human beings because of their religious affiliation. As to be demonstrated in this chapter's main part, this concept is based on a triangular relationship between inciter, audience and target group.
The common point of these three categories is that all of them contain a certain form of defamatory statement in religious matters. They differ, however, regarding the fact against whom this statement is directed: God, a religion or adherents of a religion. The definition of these three concepts, as presented here, is based on the common terminology in respective literature. 7 The question of how these concepts appear in the Rabat Plan of Action and the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights shall be analysed in this chapter's main part.
COMPARING THE RABAT PLAN AND THE EUROPEAN COURT

Formal differences between the Rabat Plan and the European Case Law regarding their legal nature
In a formal sense, the Rabat Plan of Action and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights differ greatly. The Rabat Plan is a document, which originated in a UN environment and takes a global approach. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), however, is a regional institution. It rules in its judgments whether the member states of the Council of Europe have violated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 9 Natan Lerner, an international human rights law scholar, further elaborates on its legal nature: "The Rabat document is of course, not a mandatory text and its effectiveness will depend on the degree of readiness of states, international organizations, and voluntary non-governmental bodies to implement the recommendations it contains." 10 However, as Parmar regrets, the member states are hardly paying attention to it.
11 Since it was implemented by an expert group rather than a body, institution or organisation of international law, it seems daring to refer to it as "soft law".
12 After all, it appears as an appendix to an annual report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 13 and was mentioned in a resolution on religious intolerance by the Human Rights Council.
14 However, it owes its legitimacy less to its formal rank than to the process that led to its drafting as well as its substantive content. 15 Conversely, the ECtHR's judgments are legally binding between the parties of the proceedings. 16 Hence, their effect of legal force applies only to the specific case decided by the Court. Beyond that, the court's decisions can have an indicative function especially towards other member states of the Convention. While the decision itself is not binding, a legal obligation to comply with the Convention in its interpretation specified by the ECtHR can be considered. 17 Moreover, the two instruments differ regarding their objectives. The Rabat Plan of Action drafts general recommendations, which, according to its authors, can lead to the best possible implementation of human rights standards on a global level. 18 The ECtHR, on the other hand, only rules whether a human right has been violated in a specific case. It does not decide, whether a law as such is in compliance with the ECHR. It is 12 Parmar, "The Rabat Plan of Action", 26. Parmar phrases this most carefully in observing that "the RPA might be considered as a type of international soft law". (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. (2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
Both the ICCPR and ECHR are multilateral treaties, which are legally binding on all states who have ratified them. Both of these articles implementing freedom of speech resemble each other, right down to their wording. They outline their scope of protection first, before defining the limitations within which interferences can be justified. Regarding the scope of protection, both regulations apply to the right to hold opinions, as well as the right to freedom of expression. This further includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas. In addition, the ICCPR lists different forms by which one may articulate an opinion: "either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice".
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The provision of limitations in the ICCPR only refers to the right to freedom of expression, while the one in the ECHR includes the freedom to hold opinions as well. In both cases, the possibility of restrictions is explained by stating that exercising rights entails duties and responsibilities. As legitimate purposes to justify interferences, the ICCPR lists: respect of the rights or reputations of others (Art. 19(3)(a)), protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals (Art. 19(3)(b)). Beyond that, the ECHR mentions: territorial integrity or public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Both human rights instruments require a "threepart test" for restrictions: legality, proportionality and necessity. The Rabat Plan of Action insists on this test to be performed in any case (Art. 18). For the ECtHR, the test belongs to its standard array of methods anyway. Therefore, consensus exists regarding the procedure of examining possible human rights violations.
Consensus further exists to the fact, that there is no right to freedom from criticism regarding the religious sphere. The Rabat Plan states: "Moreover, the right to freedom of religion or belief, as enshrined in relevant international legal standards, does not include the right to have a religion or a belief that is free from criticism or ridicule." 25 In its judgments, the ECtHR phrases even more pointedly: "Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Subject to Article 10(2), it is applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population." 26 by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 24 Besides that, the Court continues to stress: "Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a religious majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith."
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Besides these similarities, one substantial difference can be found in the legal bases. ICCPR Article 20(2) constitutes an obligation to the states to prohibit incitement to religious hatred. 28 This regulation forms the essential point of reference for the Rabat Plan of Action. The ECHR and its protocols do not contain a comparable norm. The ECtHR still developed a comprehensive case law regarding hate speech, as shall be demonstrated later. At the European level, a framework decision of the Council of the European Union, which covers public incitement to hate or violence against a group of persons defined by the criterion of religion or against a member of such a group Art. 1(1), needs to be pointed out. 29 The member states of the EU are thereby obliged to enact corresponding sanctions in criminal law.
The three concepts in the Rabat Plan and at the European level
Blasphemy
The Rabat Plan of Action proposes to rescind laws on blasphemy. 30 The point is that the criticisms of the Pakistani law centre on two factors, namely procedural abuses in its operation and the purportedly excessive sanctions following conviction. However, the legitimacy of the principle underpinning a law cannot be measured by such factors unless they are inherent to such a law, and it is simply not the case that 'all' blasphemy laws let alone laws justified by the UN resolutions must suffer from the same procedural flaws as does the Pakistani law." 37 See, e.g., Meeting Report Vienna (9-10 February 2011). Online at: http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Vienna/MeetingReportVienna.pdf ("The study demonstrated that the legal practice on the issues discussed is very different across countries of the region. Also, the practical approach varies."), Meeting Report Nairobi (6-7 April 2011). Online at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/ Nairobi/MeetingReportNairobi.pdf ("His findings were that legal systems differed widely in Africa.") Meeting Report Bangkok (6-7 July 2011). Online at: http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Bangkok/MeetingReportBangkok.pdf ("It was also highlighted that blasphemy penalties range from fines to imprisonment and even to the imposition of the death penalty […] .") which were presented at the four preliminary conferences, deserve continued recognition.
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Religious defamation
Regarding religious defamation, however, there are substantial divergences. The Rabat Plan does not mention the term "defamation" at all, but this does not mean that it intended to remain indifferent on this subject. As its history clearly shows, its silence rather means that it distanced itself from the concept of "religious defamation".
The UN Commission on Human Rights, and Human Rights Council respectively, passed several resolutions encouraging states to implement protection against human rights violations, which originate by defamation of religions. 39 Such resolutions were mostly pushed by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), while some Western states feared that they might be used as justification for the misapplication of blasphemy laws. 40 More recently, the OIC has backed away from this, and respective resolutions have only covered incitement to hate or violence, The Rabat Plan cites this passage in Article 17. During the Nairobi preliminary workshop in preparation of the Rabat Plan, it was repeatedly acclaimed that the OIC receded from its prior position on this subject. 44 However, does this mean that simple defamations, which do not amount to incitement to hatred in the sense of ICCPR Article 20(2), should not be prohibited? 45 Certain authors answer in the affirmative. 46 Others represent the view that prohibitions of defamation remain permissible as long as they can be justified according to the limitations clause of ICCPR Article 19(3). 47 Otherwise, expressions of opinion against religion would be less restrictable than such expressions in any other area. In the European context, the guidelines of the Council of the European Union could suggest the stance that anything not amounting to incitement to hatred is covered by freedom of speech. 48 But the following section already admits that restrictions to expressions of opinion for the sake of religion or ideology are permissible, as long as the limitations of ICCPR Article 19(3) are observed. The European Court of Human Rights examines any submitted application, according to its assignment, using the three-step test of ECHR Article 10. Depending on the outcome of this examination, it determines a violation of freedom of speech in some cases, 50 while in others it does not. 51 One of its criteria is whether such an expression contains factual criticism or rather is gratuitously offensive.
52 While this distinction may be difficult, 53 the concern that reasonable criticism must be permissible can be found in the Rabat Plan, as well. Some observe a tendency towards greater emphasis of freedom of speech in the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. 54 Others attribute this to different sets of facts. 55 At any rate, it can be observed that fewer defamation cases than those concerning incitation of hatred are submitted to the Court.
While the Venice Commission, as stated above, suggests rescinding blasphemy laws, it only deems sanctioning religious defamation as not necessary and not public] or of public health or morals, and that no national security restriction is permissible for freedom of religion and belief.") desirable. 56 Eight years earlier, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance even suggested making public insult and defamation of an individual or a group for religious reasons a punishable offence. 57 It is frequently proffered against prohibitions of defamation that they protect religions as abstract systems of teachings, whereas only individuals affiliated to certain religions or ideologies are deemed worthy of protection. Precisely this protection of individuals is implemented by the criminal offence of incitement to hatred.
58 Others object to this opinion stating that such a criminal provision only provides indirect protection, since it requires that third persons are incited to discrimination, hostility or violence. However, direct defamation of individuals because of their religion can occur as well, and those individuals are worthy of the same level of protection in such cases. 59 Prohibitions of defamation must therefore be justifiable in any case concerning a defamation of individuals. Along these lines, Italy decided on the occasion of a reform of its criminal code in 2006 to no longer penalise defamation of religions as such, but rather defamation of individuals for religious reasons.
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Incitement to religious hatred
A greater accordance between the Rabat Plan of Action and the case law of the ECtHR becomes apparent regarding incitement to religious hatred, but there are differences in detail as well. This offence is based on a triangular relationship between inciter, audience and target group. Action principally adheres to the penalisation of incitement to hatred, leaning on ICCPR Article 20(2). Due to the lack of a special provision, the ECtHR can only perform an examination according to ECHR Article 10. 63 It repeatedly considered sanctions against hate speech as justifiable interferences with freedom of speech. In particularly severe cases, it declared applications inadmissible according to ECHR Article 17, because an individual is not covered by the protection of the Convention if he or she denies its fundamental values. 64 Most decisions concern Jews or Muslims as target group, while, depending on the case, the religious, national or ethnic aspect can have priority. Neither the ICCPR nor the ECHR implement a subjective right to freedom from hate speech. 65 • Context: The ECtHR considers, whether insulting statements were made in an electoral context 71 or in the context of a general debate on the problems linked to the settlement and integration of immigrants. 72 • Speaker: If a politician is concerned, the Court attributes great importance to free political debate in a democratic society, while noting that politicians should refrain from intolerant comments. 73 Regarding this, it is in accordance with Article 24 of the Rabat Plan. 74 • Intent: A journalist is considered lacking intent if he records racist statements in a television documentary without aiming to propagate racism, but rather pointing towards social problems. 75 In another case, however, the Court determined that hate speech does not need to aim for a specific violent or criminal act. 76 • Content or form: The Court considers "content and tone", 77 the use of "military language", 78 as well as the presence of a "general, vehement attack". 79 • Extent of the speech: An insult during a public event is considered severe. 80 Showing a poster in a window was considered sufficient. 81 • Likelihood, including imminence: The guise of an artistic performance does not preclude that it was in fact as dangerous as a head-on and sudden attack. 82 Though all six elements appear, this does not mean that the Court always considers them systematically and with equal scrutiny, as the Rabat Plan desires. 83 This particularly applies to the sixth element. While the Rabat Plan requires "some degree of risk of resulting harm", the Court deems a more remote risk to be sufficient. 84 History certainly teaches that one should not wait until a threat becomes imminent. Besides that, too rigorous standards would not be covered by the language of ICCPR Article 20(2) ("any advocacy"). Although it was elaborated during the Nairobi preliminary workshop 85 that no causation needs to be perceived regarding hate speech, the Rabat Plan now advises "that such causation should be rather direct".
RELEVANCE FOR INTERRELIGIOUS AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE
The Rabat Plan of Action explains its rejection of prohibitions against blasphemy by stating that they are detrimental to the dialogue between and within religions and ideologies. While Article 19 first refers to this detrimental effect as a mere possibility, 86 the sixth recommendation for its implementation, which immediately follows the article itself, already names it as a fact without providing any further explanation. 87 It is true that dialogue requires freedom of speech. However, it would be false to assume the opposite, which is that blasphemous remarks could benefit dialogue. 88 As anyone committed to interreligious dialogue knows, slurs and provocations will undermine trust and understanding. This very point is expressed in different "rules of dialogue". 89 The most interesting message of the Rabat Plan might be its preference for positive speech rather than restrictive measures as the most effective instrument to counter hate speech. 90 Thus, it encourages to intensify intercultural and interreligious dialogue in various passages. 91 Indeed, it is to be desired, that religions and ideologies, states and non-governmental actors continue to improve their efforts to realise this assignment.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this comparison was to outline the most significant similarities and differences between the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Rabat Plan. The approach of the European Court in resolving conflict between citizens' freedom of speech and the state regulatory power is a sophisticated one and it can be applied for a successful implementation of the Rabat Plan of Action. In conclusion, it becomes apparent that the European legal instruments to protect human rights -namely the European Court of Human Rights and the former European Commission of Human Rights 92 -have developed very sophisticated methods to determine whether interferences with freedom of speech can be justified or constitute a violation of human rights. Therefore, European Court case law demonstrates a very balanced approach, bearing in mind the fundamental value that freedom of speech constitutes to every democratic society as well as the need to protect the religious feelings of individuals from insulting behaviour.
The Rabat Plan, on the other hand, is still a relatively new legal instrument. It certainly cannot be dismissed as "soft law" solely because of its formal rank, but the degree of its future implementation into national legal systems remains uncertain so far. The most substantial differences in terms of content can be reasonably explained by taking into account that the experts who drafted the Rabat Plan had one must try to experience it from within, which requires a 'passing over', even if only momentarily, into another's religious or ideological experience.") 90 Bielefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief, 499. ("Hate speech can best be countered by 'positive speech'. This may be the most interesting message of the Rabat Plan of Action […] .") 91 See, e.g., Rabat Plan of Action, art 25. ("To tackle the root causes of intolerance, a much broader set of policy measures is necessary, for example in the areas of intercultural dialogue -reciprocal knowledge and interaction -or education for pluralism and diversity, and policies empowering minorities and Indigenous People to exercise their right to freedom of expression."); art 29, rec 2 to States ("States should promote intercultural understanding."); art 29, rec 1 to other Stakeholders ("Non-governmental organisations, national human rights institutions as well as other civil society groups should create and support mechanisms and dialogues to foster intercultural and interreligious understanding and learning.") 92 The European Commission of Human Rights was a special tribunal. From 1954 to 1998, individuals did not have direct access to the European Court of Human Rights, but had to apply to the Commission, which if it found the case to be well-founded would launch a case in the Court on the individual's behalf.
to consider its global scope: for example, the strict opposition against blasphemy laws is comprehensible since their abuse by totalitarian governments to persecute dissidents or minorities is still a substantial threat in many countries of the world. In most European countries, however, this risk can fortunately be deemed negligiblepreventing an exploitation of these countries' high standards of freedom of speech seems the more pressing matter there. Therefore, a correlation exists between the documents' legal nature, their global as opposed to merely regional scope and their material content. This was substantiated in this chapter by analysing the Rabat Plan of Action and the ECtHR Case Law regarding their legal nature, legal bases and content.
Eventually, these observations demonstrate that both legal instruments could benefit from each other. The ECtHR will certainly consider the principles set forth in the Rabat Plan in its future judicature, adjusting them to the specific situation in Europe. Countries intending to adopt these principles into their legal system or to establish institutions like a human rights court for the first time can take advantage of the longterm experience laid down in the European case law during this process, always considering that they need to be aligned with the particularities of their own cultural and legal circumstances. From an African point of view, it might be an interesting observation that, even in Europe, freedom of speech is not an absolute right, but can be restricted considering religious, historical and cultural prerequisites. However, since any such restriction is subject to a strict examination of its proportionality, harsh penalties are not justifiable by any means.
